Xi Jinping: The Impostor Leader

Xi did not assume leadership on his own merits, but he is fully responsible for his own demise.

Within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping’s early reputation was decidedly mediocre. He failed to distinguish himself as a mishu (secretary or apprentice) at the Ministry of Defense, made no notable impression in Hebei Province, and left little impact during his long tenure in Fujian from 1985 to 1999.

Yet Xi’s formative years were marked by deep personal hardship. His step-sister committed suicide after being persecuted by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. His mother was coerced into publicly denouncing his father, Xi Zhongxun, who was purged in 1962 and spent the next 16 years either imprisoned or assigned to menial labor. From the ages of 9 to 25, Xi scarcely saw his father and was himself sent to perform hard manual labor far from home throughout much of his adolescence.

So how did Xi Jinping become the leader of China?

That question has been central to my research for the past eight years, and it’s an essential one for anyone seeking to understand China’s trajectory and its relations with the West. I’ve documented my findings in a series of articles here under the title The Ye-Xi Clique.

There is little evidence that Xi had any political ambition before the late 1990s. And even when he may have begun to consider it, he appeared to lack both the temperament and intellectual strength to rise within the CCP on merit. What he did have, however, were powerful connections—most importantly, the Ye brothers: Ye Xuanping and Ye Xuanning, two of the most influential red princelings in China. I am convinced these two paved the way for Xi to become General Secretary in 2012, with their efforts dating back to 1991.

The Ye brothers (technically half-brothers—their father had six children with six different wives) were known as the “Emperor of Southern China” and the “Spiritual Leader of the Princelings.” As sons of Marshal Ye Jianying, they were determined to leave a legacy as monumental as their father’s, who was revered for his role in the founding and consolidation of the PRC. Their support for Xi is puzzling, given his limitations. It's likely their father, who had close ties with Xi Zhongxun, encouraged them to look after young Xi. But the Ye brothers did more than offer casual support—they actively maneuvered to install him in power. One wonders whether they ever paused to ask themselves, “We’re putting this guy in Zhongnanhai… he’d better not screw this up.”

Ye Xuanning died in 2016 and Ye Xuanping in 2019. Roughly six years after their deaths, Xi’s leadership began visibly unraveling. I believe he won’t last through this year—possibly not even this month.

Leaders with Xi’s kind of upbringing often swing to extremes: some grow empathetic and just; others, hardened and cruel. Xi chose the latter path.

As I noted in my article Father and Son, both Xi and his father left their marks on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—but in very different ways. Xi Zhongxun is remembered for building respectful alliances in Xinjiang. Xi Jinping is responsible for labor camps, reeducation programs, and what many regard as genocide. Xi Zhongxun played a key role in China’s policy toward Hong Kong and Taiwan, helping attract investors and integrate the regions into China’s economic rise. Xi Jinping, by contrast, betrayed the “one country, two systems” promise to Hong Kong and pushed Taiwan further away through years of military threats and belligerence. In the mid-1990s, a majority of Taiwanese still favored eventual unification with China. After thirteen years of Xi’s saber-rattling, that consensus has collapsed.

Xi’s final legacy—and what may ultimately bring his downfall—is his treatment of China’s private sector. Friends of mine in China describe how businesses were hit with surprise audits and retroactive tax penalties, sometimes dating back five years. These acts of arbitrary cruelty became a hallmark of Xi’s rule, and they killed the goose that laid the golden eggs for China’s economy.

In the next few articles, I’ll outline the major (or rather, disastrous) episodes of Xi’s rule since 2012. Who knows? By the time this series ends, China may already have a new leadership team.